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Cert to CA9 (Pre rson, ~erquson, 
Gilliam [dj]) 
or_ 
GUERRA, et aV (Califo Federal/Civil Timely 
Fair ployment 
Officials) ~ 
SUMMARY: challenge a California statue that 
employees who take p to four months of maternity leave be 




statute is preempted by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PD~), 42 
u.s.c. 2000e(k). 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: A Cali~ornia statute requires 
employers covered by title VII to grant pregnancy disability leave 
of up to four months to their employees. Cal Gov't Code §12945(b) (2) 
provides that 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based 
upon a bona fide occupational qualification: 
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions ... 
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a 
reasonable period of time~ provided, such period shall 
not exceed four months. Such employee shall be entitled 
to utilize any accrued vacation leave during this period 
of time. Reasonable period of time means that period 
during which the female employee is disabled on account 
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 
Regulations require such employers to reinstate such employees to 
~ 
their old jobs at the end of the four months. Failure to reinstate 
to a former position is permissible only if business necessity makes 
it impossible to do so~ there is a rebuttable presumption that the 
pregnant employee's position may be filled by a temporary employee. 
One of petr Cal Fed's employees, Lillian Garland, was not 
immediately offered her former position as a receptionist/PBX 
operator when she sought to return from her four month pregnancy 
leave. Resp California Dep't of Fair Employment then filed a 
complaint against petr for failure to reinstate Garland as required 
by the California statute and regulations. 
Cal Fed then filed this suit in district court seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of 
§12945(b) (2), on the grounds that the California provision 
conflicted with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requirement that 
pregnancy related disabilities be treated no differently from any 
other disability. 42 u.s.c. §2000e{k) provides that 
{k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis 
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit 
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 
2000e-2{h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit 
otherwise. 
The de enjoined enforcement of the Cal statute, ruling that the 
statute required reverse discrimination in favor of female employees 
that is prohibited by title VII and constitutes an impermissible 
classification based upon pregnancy prohibited by the PDA. ___ Relying 
on Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co v. EEOC, 462 u.s. 669 
{1983), the de held that §12945{b) {2) impermissibly discriminates 
against male employees. 
CA9 reversed. The unanimous panel relied upon title ''II's 
narrow pre-emption clause, 42 u.s.c. §§2000e-7, h-4, which evidences 
an intent not to preempt more restrictive state antidiscrimination 
laws: "nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as 
invalidating any provision of state law unless such provision is 
inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision 
thereof." 42 u.s.c. §2000h-4. CA9 then relied on the PDA's purpose 
to reverse this Court's decisions holding that employer policies 
treating pregnancy related disabilities less favorably than other 
medical conditions did not constitute sex discrimination in 
violation of title VII. E.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 
u.s. 125 {1976). The Court's decision in Newport News merely 
required that pregnancy related disabilities be treated no less 
' favorably than other medical disabilities; neither the PDA nor 
Newport News bars a state from requiring employers to take pregnancy 
into account in a way that favors pregnant women. While there is 
some tension between PDA's first clause, which bars discrimination 
against pregnancy (and thus recognizes pregnancy as a distinct 
problem), and its second clause, which bars classification according 
to pregnancy, this tension must be resolved in favor of achieving 
affirmative equality in employment opportunities for women. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr points out that pregnancy favoring statutes 
have been enacted in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Montana, as 
well as in California, and that resolution of the validity of these 
statutes under the PDA is thus an issue of national importance. ~he 
plain language of the PDA explicitly bars any classification of 
employees based upon pregnancy, and this language accords with the 
intent of Congress that pregnant employees be treated no 
differently--neither better nor worse--than non-pregnant employees. 
The CA9 decision thus conflicts with the plain language and 
intention of the PDA. The CA9's decision is also in conflict with 
EEOC guidelines which bar employers from implementing benefits 
available only to pregnant women, and thus hampers enforcement of 
title VII by the EEOC. Petr also contends that the CA9 decision, by 
upholding a statute premised on the assumption that women are a 
special class in need of special state protection, establishes a 
dangerous precedent that is in fact contrary to equal opportunity 
for women. Finally, the CA9 decision conflicts with this Court's 
holding in Newport News, since that case stands for the principle 
that differential treatment of pregnancy--whether it is women or men 
who benefit from the differential treatment--violates the PDA ban 
against pregnancy discrimination. 
Resp emphasizes the narrow preemption clause of title VII: 
state discrimination laws are preempted only if they require 
employers to do that which is unlawful under title VII. ~he 
legislative history of the PDA reflects that statutes similar to the 
statute here involved were referred to with approval by the drafters 
of the PDA. H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 4749, 4759. Resp argues that title VII is aimed at providing 
equal opportunity to women~ thus, state prohibition of no-leave 
policies which have a disparate impact upon women is consonant with 
that goal. Resp points out that CADC has held that the denial of 
leave may itself violate title VII because such a policy has a 
disparate impact upon women of childbearing age. Abraham v. Graphic 
Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811 (CADC 1981). Similarly, the EEOC 
guidelines state that a no leave policy with a disparate impact upon 
women violates title VII. 29 C.F.R. §1604.10(c) (1985). ~aking 
pregnancy into account in a way that lessens the impact of pregnancy 
on women's employment opportunities is consistent with the dissent 
in Gilbert, and thus consistent with PDA's purpose to overrule 
Gilbert. Finally, the statute provides no special protection for 
women: it merely removes a substantial disadvantage suffered by 
women. 
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States (CCUS) has 
submitted an amicus brief in support of petr. Basically, CCUS 
repeats the legislative history arguments of the petr, emphasizing 
that Congress did not mean for women to get special benefits as the 
result of the PDA. CCUS also contends that the CA9 violates this 
Court's understanding of the PDA in Newport News. 
DISCUSSION: An identical issue is presented by the 
jurisdictional statement in No. 84-1545-ASX, Miller Wahl ~o. v. 
Montana Comm'r of Labor and Industry (May 16, 1985 Conference). In 
Miller-Wahl, the Montana S Ct upheld a state statute barring 
discharge of an employee for a pregnancy related disability against 
a PDA preemption challenge. The ~ourt CVSGed in Miller-Wahl, but 
the VSG have yet to be received. Since this petn presents the exact 
same issue as Miller-Wahl, but in a cleaner procedural context, T 
recommend relisting this case with Miller-Wahl with a view to a 
grant and argument in tandem should the Court give plenary 
consideration to that appeal. 
I recommend relisting this petn with No. 84-1545-ASX. 
There is a response and a reply. 
October 31, 1985 Coplan Opn in petn 
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No. 85-494, California Federal Savin~s & Loan Association, et al. 
v. Guerra, et al. (Cali ornia official s) (CA 9) 
Memorandum to File 
This case presents the question 'tvhether Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
of 1978, preempts the California statute also adopted in 1978. 
Title VII is a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that includes 
specific provisions with respect to the preemption of state 
legislation. Section 1104 provides: 
"Nothing contained in any title of this 
1/H ~ J.o Act shall be construed as indicating an 
~ intent on the part of Congress to occupy 
 ~ the field in which any such title operates 
~ ~ to the exclusion of State laws on the same 
b ~~~~ J~-5~ subject matter, nor shall any provision of 
~  this Act be construed as invalidating any 
~~ ~ ~ ~ provision of State law u~s such P-rovision 
~> ~ :1~ v ~ i q_,1\.lnrcnsis t.ep t 'with any o.f the purposes of 
~-- th~s Af_t, or ar;y--prQvisiop_ the.uof." 
-5'1-~~w~- --·-
~ Although the foregoing section leaves the states free to 
enact certain legislation, it also provides that a state law 
shall not be "inconsistent with any of the purposes of this 
act, or any provision thereof". Title VII, as amended by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, now includes a prohibition 
against discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions", and declares that women affected 
No. 85-494 2. 
by pregnancy "shall be treated the same for all employment 
related purposes .. . as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to work." 
The California pregnancy disability law, at issue in 
this case, shares many of the same goals as the Federal Act. 
It achieves its purposes, however, in a somewhat different 
manner. It accords special treatment to pregnant female 
employees by requiring that employers guarantee those employees 
disability leave up to four months, and provides quite explicit 
reinstatement rights, regardless of the employer's disability 
leave policies toward other employees. Thus, as argued by peti-
tioners - and also by the SG in his amicus brief - the state law 
is in conflict with the basic principle of equal treatment of male 
and female employees contemplated by Title VII and specifically 
extended to pregnancy based classifications by the 1978 Act. 
This case turns primarily on the fact that the California 
Act requires benefits for pregnancy disability that are not 
required in California for other employees. 
The DC held that the California Act was preempted by Title 
VII as amended in 1978 because of its guarantee of special 
treatment for pregnancy disabled employees. The CA reversed the 
DC, holding that nothing in the Federal Act prevented a state 
from providing more favorable treatment to pregnant employees. 
i.\1 0 . 8 5- 4 9 4 3. 
We granted cert to decide the preemption issue as the question 
may be important ~7ith respect to other state laws. 
Petitioners' brief, prepared by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 
and the SC's amicus brief, make persuasive arguments in support 
of preemption . The brief on behalf of respondents by the 
Attorney General of California also is a strong brief. In 
addition, there are several amicus briefs only two of which I 
have looked at preliminarily: one on behalf of the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States that supports reversal of CA 9, 
and one on behalf of the American Federation of Labor that sup-
ports affirmance. Neither of these briefs adds significantly 
to the principal briefs of the parties. 
The SG relies particularly on § 2000e(k) of Title VII 
as amended that reads as follows: 
"[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes, 
including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so 
affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work ·k ·k ·k." 
Relying primarily on the foregoing language, and the basic 
purpose of Title VII's prohibition of discrimination, the SG 
and petitioners argue that Title VII bars any difference in 
treatment on the basis of pregnancy. The basic purpose of the 
No. 85-494 4. 
Federal statute is to assure "equal treatment of male and 
female employees." This view is supported by language in 
the Reports of both the House and Senate that also emphasize 
equal treatment . The argument therefore is made that the 
California statute conflicts with Federal law because it 
provides preferential treatment for pregnant employees. 
Section 12945(b)(2) of the California law requires employers 
to reinstate female employees returning from pregnancy dis-
ability leave to the job they previously held, unless that 
position is no longer available due to "business necessity", 
in which case the employer must make a reasonable good faith 
effort to reinstate the employee to a substantially similar 
job." Neither side in this controversy argues that these 
provisions lack substantive merit. Rather, the only question 
before us is 111hether the requirement of the Federal Act for 
"equal treatment" prevents a state from providing more 
favorable treatment to pregnant women than it provides - for 
example - to men who for some other disability are placed on 
leave and then return to work. 
The California Attorney General acknowledges that the 
state statute "supplements" the protection afforded pregnant 
women under the Federal law, but argues that the authority of 
No. 85-494 5. 
the states to enact laws more favorable to pregnant women 
are not preempted. Generally, I think the Federal govern-
ment should allow the states wide latitude in employment 
matters, especially where the state is the employee. But my 
view has not prevailed. See my dissenting opinion in Garcia. 
I am tentatively inclined to think that petitioners and the 
SG have the better of the preemption argument in this case. 
I am not at rest, however, and will be interested in the views 





August 13, 1986 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-494, California Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra 
Cert. to CA9 (Pregerson, Ferguson, C.J.s, Gilliam, D.J.) 
Wednesday, Oct. 8, 1986 (first case) 
I 
The need to eliminate discrimination against women on the 
basis of their pregnancy prompted both the federal Government and 
various states to enact laws designed to achieve this goal. This 
case involves two such statutes~he federal Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1~8 (PDA) and~n amendment to the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act. The issue presented is whether the 
PDA preempts the California statute, which requires that employ-...------
ers grant pregnant women a reasonable leave and job security dur-
ing the leave period. 
II 
The California statute provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless 
based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: 
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female 
employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related 
medical conditions ...• 
( 2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a 
reasonable period of tlme; provided, such period shall 
not exceed four months. Such employee shall be enti-
tled to utiliz an accrued vacation leave ~uring this 
per1od of time. Reasonab e per1o o t1m~ means that 
period during which the female employee is disabled on 
account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
cond it i<\ms ..•. 
Cal. Gov't Code §12945. This has been interpreted by resps, the~ 
California Fair Employment and Housing Commission and its offi-
cers, as requiring employers to provide pregnant employees with 
---"'---~ - - ~ 
unpaid disability leave for the period of their disability and to 
reinstate employees returning from pregnancy leave to the job 
~
previously held, unless that position is no longer available due ______ ......__..., 
- ---
to business necessit~ in which case the employer must attempt to 
reinstate the employee to a substantially similar job. 
Federal law regarding discrimination on the basis of preg- ~ 
(V]l \ ....___ 
nancy is embodied in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, -an! amend-
v 
ment to Title VII. Title VII provides that it is an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against any 
individual •.. because of such individual's ... sex." The Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, added in 1978, provides: 
f 
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the 
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions: and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same 
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt 
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other 
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work, .... 




Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be 
construed as indicating an intent on the part of Con-
gress to occupy the field in which any such title oper-
ates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject 
matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be con-
strued as invalidating any provision of State law . .Y,n-J V 
less such ovision is 'nconsistent with any of the 
purposes of this Act or any provision t ereo . 
~-;:::. 
42 u.s.c. §2000h-4. 
Petr California Federal Savings and Loan Asso~ 
Fed) is an employer within the meaning of both the Cal 
and Title VII. Cal Fed's disability leave policy cover~ 
abilities, including those caused by pregnancy. The pt 
lows all employees to take disability leave, but does not 
"leave" to guarantee the returning employee the same pc.. 
absent business necessity. Under its leave policy, the company 
.L ~Jge 4. 
~~-~f~~ 
~f-lo~~~ 
must make a good faith effort to prove{h; ~~ ~~ !~J 
ilar and suitable position. If one is not available, however, 
~~~~~~~-=~·~ ---,, \) 
Cal Fed may terminate the employee. In May 1983, resp California 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing issued an administra-
tive accusation against petr on behalf of an employee who was not 
immediately reinstated to her previous position at the conclusion 
of her pregnancy leave. She was ultimately reinstated to a simi-
lar position six months later. 
Petr, joined by other aggrieved employers, brought suit in 
federal district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
California pregnancy disability law is preempted by Title VII, 
and an injunction against its enforcement. The parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment based upon stipulated facts. 
The ~C held in favor of petrs, finding the California law "incon- bc:-
sistent with the purpose of Congress in enacting the [PDA] to~ 
~· 
eliminate classifications based on pregnancy and with the pur- ~ 
poses of Title VII to provide equal treatment for males and fe-
males." The DC thus found the Califonia law preempted by Title 
VII because the state law required or permitted conduct unlawful 
under Title VII. f'/J1 
v 
Resps appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed. The -CA9 examined this Court's decision in Newport News Shipbuilding & 
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). In Newport News, this 
Court found that a company could not exclude pregnancy coverage --------
for a male employee's wife 
ful~ under the company disability plan. (You joined 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent in which he found Title VII to cover 
only discrimination in the benefit coverage of employees, not 
their dependants) . The CA9 quoted the ma.jor i ty opinion in New-
port News, which extended pregnancy coverage to male employees' 
wives even though "[t]he cost of providing complete health insur-
ance coverage for the dependants of male employees, including 
pregnant wives, might exceed the cost of providing such coverage 
for the dependents of female employees." California Savings & 
Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F. 2d 390, 396 (CA9 1985). The CA9 
found "no principled reason to distinguish pregnancy disability 
days from pregnancy disability dollars." Ibid. -- The CA9 
found that the PDA created only "a floor beneath which pregnancy 
disability benefits may not drop -- not a ceiling above which 
v 
they may not rise." Ibid. The CA9 found that the goal of Title 
VII was "equality of opportunity, not necessarily sameness of 
treatment." Id. at 396 n. 7. Consequently, the CA9 concluded 
that the California law extending preferential treatment to preg-
nancy-related disabilities was not inconsistent with the goals of 
Title VII and thus was not preempted. 
III 
The first issue to be resolved is whether the PDA pre-
cludes preferential treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities. 
~ If the CA9 is correct that the PDA merely establishes a floor on 
pregnancy disability benefits, then the California statute, even 
if interpreted to allow employers to treat pregnancy differently 
from other disabilities, is not in conflict with the PDA. 
l'-~ Vii 
There is no question that the PDA aces not require pref-
erential treatment of pregnancy. The language of the PDA itself 
states that "women affected by pregnancy ... shall be treated the 
' 
same •.• as other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work." The legislative history confirms 
that the PDA: 
does not require employers to treat pregnant employees 
in any particular manner ... and in no way requires the 
institution of any new programs where none currently ~ 
exist. The bill would simply }\require" that pregnant [ ~ ... J 
women be ~ as otner employees on the ~ · 
basis of their ability or inability to work. /~ 
H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978). The question ~ 
is whether this same language mandates equal treatment of preg- ~ 
nancy and all other d}sabilities. 
~---
"The starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
7Zi-L4. J7'il 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (Powell, J., concurring). The P~ 
states that pregnant women shall be treated the same as other 
individuals with similar disabilities, according to their ability 
to work. The common definj tion of "same" is "not different: ) 
identical." The American Heritage Dictionary 114 7 ( 1976). The )~ 
Senate Report confirms this definition, "[T]his bill would pre-
vent employers from treating pregnancy and childbirth differently 
from other causes of disability." S. Rep. no. 331, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 4 (1977). This Court will "give effect to .. plain 
language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended 
the language to have some more restrictive meaning." Shaw v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 u.s. 85, 97 (1983). 
Here, there are good reasons to believe that the plain 
language of the PDA means what it says. The general rule under 
Title VII is that employers cannot make sex-based classifications 
' 
when functional classifications are possible. The focus under 
Title VII is on individual ability, not generalizations about 
groups. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 u.s. 
248, 259 (1981) (Powell, J.); City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water 
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978). The PDA echoes 
this concept by requiring that pregnant women "be treated ..• the 
same ... as other persons" on the basis of "their ability or 
inability to work." The legislative history reinforces this 
view: 
[T] he bill rejects the view that employers may treat 
pregnancy and its incidents as sui gener is, without 
regard to its functional comparability to other condi-
tions. 
S. Rep. at 4. 
Resps make much of the fact that the House and Senate Com-
mittee Reports note many state statutes dealing with pregnancy, a 
few of which are similar to the California statute at issue here. 
There is no indication, however, that Congress approved preferen-
tial treatment for pregnancy. In fact, in light of the develop-
ments of Title VII law at the time of the enactment of the PDA, 
the opposite inference is more compelling. By 1978 when the PDA 
was enacted, courts had uniformly invalidated state protective 
legislation, and the EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination re-
quired that any preference given to females by state statute be 
extended to males. 29 C.F.R. §1604.2(b)(l975). These develop-
ments reinforce the view that Congress meant what it said when it 
page 8. 
required that pregnant women be tr~ated "the same" as other dis-
abled workers. 
Resps argue that reading the second clause of the PDA to 
mandate equal treatment among disabilities would contradict the 
first clause which makes pregnancy a protected sexual character-
is tic under Title VII. That is, only by treating pregnancy 
differently than other disabilities can equal employment opportu-
nity be achieved. Because this view was adopted by the CA9 and 
is superficially appealing, it requires some discussion. 
Title VII guarantees equal employment opportunity to women 
/ 
and men. Resps contend that treating pregnancy "the same" as any 
other disability would result in discrimination against women 
bec::~_use only women get pregnant. According to resps, Califor-
-------M--
nia's statute furthers the goal of employment opportunity because 
it "merely removes a burden uniquely faced by female employees." 
Resp. Br. at 14. Thus, the California legislation is a progres-
sive step toward ensuring that the employment opportunity of 
women and men is "the same" even though women are ostensibly pro-
vided greater disability coverage. Resps in effect rely on a 
~ common sense approach to support their contention that pregnancy 
is so different from any other disability that Congress must have 
meant to allow unequal treatment of pregnancy and other disabil-
i ties in order to achieve equal employment opportunity between 
women and men. Close analysis reveals, however, that resps' the- ~ 
ory is flawed. 
"" 
The history and language of the PDA indicate the manner in 
which pregnancy was intended to operate as a protected character-
istic under Title VII. The PDA was enacted to overrule this 
I 
Court's decision in Gilbert v. General Electric Corp., 429 u.s. 
125 (1976). In that case, the Court held that exclusion of preg-
nancy disability from a company disability plan was not sex-based 
discrimination and therefore was not prohibited by Title VII. 
The Court in Gilbert reasoned that the distinction made in ex-
eluding pregnancy from an employee benefit plan was between preg-
nan t people and nonpregnant people, not between women and men. 
429 u.s. at 134-135. Thus, according to the Court, pregnancy-
based discrimination was not sex-based and was not prohibited by 
Title VII. Congress rejected this interpretation of pregnancy in 
the PDA. The PDA includes "because of pregnancy" in the defini-
tion of "because of sex", thus explicitly defining pregnancy dis-
crimination as sex-based discrimination. 
It is important to note that Congress included pregnancy 
as a sex-based category of discrimination, not in a category by 
itself. Thus, pregnancy is a protected characteristic because it 
is sex-based. Resps confuse this concept in their disparate im-
pact analysis. Obviously, if an employer has a leave policy 
which is inadequate to accomodate pregnancy, then pregnant people 
will be disadvantaged vis-a-vis other workers. This, however, is 
not the relevant inquiry. Because pregnancy is defined in Title 
VII as a sex-based characteristic, any disparate impact analysis 
must compare the impact of a leave policy on women as opposed to 
men. 
Resps' "equal employment opportunity" argument must rely 
on an assumption that without guaranteed leave and job protection 
1:"'" -:;J- ,.,_ ...,. 
for pregnancy, women will be denied equal employment opportunity 
I 
because of their sex. Resps offer little factual support for 
this position and offer no evidence which compares the impact on 
the sexes of a restrictive leave policy. Resps' ; heory, stated I 
is that in a hypothetical situation where no leave is simply, 
allowed for any disability, women will suffer a disparate impact 
because pregnancy would require them to lose their jobs. In con-
trast, men could have children and retain their jobs. This dis-
parate impact analysis, however, relies on the unproven assump-
tion that pregnancy is the only disability disproportionately 
incurred by one sex. Certainly, pregnancy is uniquely incurred 
by women because of their biology and it is a biological fact 
that during a certain period of time during pregnancy and/or 
childbirth, women are unable to work. But, there must be a num-
ber of injuries which are disproportionately incurred by men and ~ 
which render men unable to wor • 
statistically significant difference in disability leave required 
by men and women, rebutting any "common sense" notion that women 
as a group require greater leave time than men because of the 
biological fact that only women get pregnant. 
Resps' theoretical error is that they focus on one life 
activity which imposes a greater disability burden on women than 
men. In regard to employment opportunity, however, their focus 
is too narrow because they fail to realize that life consists of 
a number of activities, the burden of which may be disproportion-
ately borne by one sex for biological or sociological reasons. 
For example, it is a biologi~al_ ~-------
pd~~ J.J.. 
physically stronger than women. Men may thus disproportionately 
' 
engage in heavy lifting. Heavy lifting is a major cause of de-
bilitating back injuries. Failure to provide a reasonable leave 
period for back injuries would have a disparate impact on male 
employment opportunity. To take this argument to its extreme, 
moving heavy furniture may require men to lose their jobs whereas 
women can get heavy furniture moved and retain their jobs. Thus, 
resps' assertion that mandatory pregnancy leave policy simply 
equalizes the sexes is too facile in that it fails to account for 
other disabilities which, although not as clearly incurred by one I 
sex as pregnancy, nevertheless are disproportionately incurred by 
one sex. 
~liance by resps and the CA9 on Newport News, supra, to 
support pregnancy-based classifications is similarly misplaced. 
The Court in Newport News found an employee benefit plan dis-
criminatory because it denied payment for pregnancies incurred by 
the wives of male employees. The theory was that the male em-
ployees' benefit package was less complete because all risks were ---covered for female employees but not for male employees. Under 
..__.....~~..........., 
-~ .. ---
this reasoning, it should be similarly invalid for an employer to 
provide greater coverage for one sex-specific risk pregnancy -
- than for others. In such a situation, male employees would 
receive a less inclusive benefit plan than female employees be-
cause none of their sex-specific risks would be covered whereas 
one sex-specific risk would be covered for female employees. The 
Court in Newport News noted that: 
By making clear that an employer could not discriminate 
on the basis of an employee's , pregnancy, Congress did 
not erase the original prohibition against discrimina-
tion on the basis of an employee's sex. 
462 U.S. at 684-685. This is exactly the principle that resps 
and the CA9 ignore. 
Even resps' basic argument that preferential treatment of 
pregnancy removes a burden from female employment opportunity is 
far from intuitive. If employers are forced to provide greater 
benefits for pregnancy as opposed to any other disabilities, they 
may be more reluctant to hire women because of the potentially 
greater disability liability. Thus, Congress may well have de-
cided that equal employment opportunity is best achieved by com-
pletely equal treatment of all disabilities, including pregnancy. 
In sum, resps' "equal opportunity" theory is at the very 
least debateable and is probably theoretically flawed. Resps 
therefore fail to demonstrate that the words of the PDA cannot 
logically be read to have their plain meaning. Consequently, the 
~~~. l PDA should be read to mean what it appears to say -- that it is 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to treat pregnan-
~~ 
· ~ ~~ cy differently from other disabilities. 
IV 
A finding that the PDA requires that employers treat preg-
nancy the same as other disabilities does not end the inquiry in 
this case. If an employer had a policy similar to the statute at 
issue in this case and applied it in such a way that pregnancy 
were treated differently from other disabilities, the employer's 
policy would be invalid under Title VII. Here, however, the chal-
lenge is to a state statute, not to a particular employment prac-
tice. Sex-based classifications in state statutes are not chal-
--------------~"""'---~-'-------- ----·-------
lenged directly under Title VII because Title VII only regulates 
......... _ ------------· - ·-
employers' conduct. Statutory classifications are normally chal-
~
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause. But an Equal Protec-
tion challenge is not possible in this case because this Court 
has held that under the Constitution, pregnancy is not a sex-
based classification. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 u.s. 484 (1974). 
Thus, it is not facially illegal for the state to use pregnancy 
as a classification in its statute. Any challenge to the state 
~-~ 
statute here must focus on the statute's effect on employers, the 
only parties regulated by Title VII. Petrs therefore argue that 
Title VII preempts enforcement of the California statute because 
of the effect enforcement would have on employers. 
Federal law may preempt state law in a number of ways. 
Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Board, 467 U.S. 461, 
469 (1983). Here, Congress has explicitly defined the extent to 
which it intended Title VII to preempt state law: where "such 
law ..• purports to require or permit the doing of any act which 
would be an unlawful employment practice under this title," 42 
u.s.c. §2000e-7, or where a provision "is inconsistent with any 
of the purposes of this Act or any provision thereof." 42 U.S.C. 
§2000h-4. Both of these clauses are contained in paragraphs 
which express the general policy of non-preemption of state law. 
Moreover, the California statute was enacted pursuant to the 
state's police power. In this situation, "We start with the as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the State [are] not 
to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress." Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 
U.S. at 525 (quoting Rice v.Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 u.s. at 
230). Thus, there is a presumption against preemption of the 
California statute. 
Amici (instead of resps) argue that the California statute 
does not require employers to do any unlawful act because it sim-
ply requires employers to provide leave for pregnant workers. 
Employers thus remain free to provide leave on an equal basis to 
all disabled workers and in this way can comply with both the 
California statute and Title VII. They argue that when such a 
reconciliation between state and federal law can be found, it 
should be adopted in lieu of preemption. 
Amici appear correct that the California statute does not 
require employers to violate Title VII. Whether the statute ~­
mits employers to violate Title VII is a more difficult question. 
Read in context, the "require or permit" language appears to ad-
dress mandatory or permissive state statutes. That is, a statute 
would be preempted if it said employers "must classify employees 
on the basis of pregnancy" or that they "may" do so. A narrow 
reading of "permit" follows from the general non-preemption goal 
of Title VII. Reading "permit" narrowly also seems the only way 
to retain its meaning. Any broader reading would render preempt-
ed under Title VII any statute which did not expressly forbid the 
employment practices which are illegal under Title VII. Thus, 
because it does not contain an explicit mandate of unequal treat-
ment of disabilities or a statement of permission, the California 
statute does not appear to "require or permit" unlawful employ-
ment practices within the meaning of' Title VII. 
But, the quick conclusion that Title VII does not preempt 
the California statute would ignore the fact that the practical ------------------
result of a finding of non-preemption would be to read the Cali-
fornia statute to apply to all disabilities. Although this Court ---------------should strain to avoid a finding of preemption, "[t]he canon fa-
voring constructions of statutes to avoid constitutional ques-
tions does not •.• license a court to usurp the policymaking and 
legislative functions of duly elected representatives." Heckler 
v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741 (1984). This Court should not use 
its remedial powers to "circumvent the intent of the leg isla-
ture." Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
Here, the clear language of the California statute indi-j 
cates that the state legislature only contemplated extending 
benefits to pregnant women. There is no indication that the leg-
islature intended such benefits across the board, except the fact 
that the legislature contemplated that the PDA might be enacted 
soon after the California statute. It is a large leap to assume 
that the legislature knew that the pregnancy distinction in its 
statute would then be unlawful and thus that the effect of the 
California statute would be to extend benefits to all disabled 
workers. Had the legislators explicitly contemplated this re-
sult, they would not have limited the statutory wording to preg-
nancy. The more logical inference to be drawn from the mention 
of only one disability is that th~ legislature did not contem-
plate that the statute would apply to all disabilities. 
A finding that the California legislature did not intend 
its statute to apply to all disabilities is also a finding that 
the legislature intended to allow employers to treat pregnancy 
differently from other disabilities. Under this reading of the 
statute, it indeed was intended to "permit the doing of . . . an 
unlawful employment practice." When given its logical meaning, 
the California statute thus falls within the narrow Title VII 
preemption clause. Under the same analysis, the California stat-
ute is also "inconsistent with [one] of the purposes of the Act," 
which is equal treatment of pregnancy and other disabilities, and 
thus is preempted under the general Civil Rights Act preemption 
clause. 
Amici argue that even if the California statute is invalid 
because the intent of the California legislature was to allow 
employers to treat pregnancy differently than other disabilities, 
the proper remedy for this Court to impose is extension of the 
statute, not nullification. When faced with the choice between 
extension and nullification of a statute, this Court should 
"measure the intensity of commitment to the residual policy and 
consider the degree of potential disruption of the statutory 
scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation." 
Heckler, supra, 465 U.S. at 739. Obviously, the California leg-
islature was committed to protecting pregnant women from employ-
ment discrimination. The PDA, however, addresses this concern to 
a large degree. The California legislature's commitment to the 
J::IQ':jl:: .J.. I • 
extra measure of guaranteed pregnancy leave is unknown. As to 
the second factor, the disruption to the statutory scheme from 
extension of the statute to all disabilities appears potentially 
large. Amici indicate that only approximately 20% of all leave 
taken by women is for pregnancy. Extension of the statute would 
thus pose a burden on employers potentially numerous times great-
er than that contemplated by the California legislature. Amici 
contend that extending benefits to all workers would not increase 
costs significantly because the leave provided is unpaid. But, 
another benefit provided is job reinstatement. It may well cost 
employers more to keep the job open and work with temporary help 
than to replace the worker. 
The policy developed by this Court in Equal Protection 
cases where a state statute is found unconstitutional and the 
legislative intent regarding extension is not clear has usually 
been to leave the decision of whether to extend or rescind bene-
fits to the state. E.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 
446 u.s. 142, 153 (1980) ("[B]ecause a remedial outcome consonent 
with the state legislature's overall purpose is preferable, we 
believe that state judges are better positioned to choose an ap-
propriate method of remedying the constitutional violation."); 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U.S. 7 (1975); see also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 93-
96 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing for 
invalidation of the federal statute rather than extension). Ami-
ci point out that in Title VII cases, the trend has been the op-
posite. But, these cases usually do not involve state sovereign-
ty and only pertain to a particular policy of a particular em-
' ployer. Thus, in these cases a court is able to weigh the costs 
imposed and make a decision based on facts in the record. More-
over, in Title VII actions challenging a state statute this has 
not been the clear trend. See Homemakers, Inc. of Los Angeles v. 
Division of Industrial Welfare, 509 F. 2d 20 (CA9 1974), cert. 
denied, 423 u.s. 1063 (1976); B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employ-
ment Discrimination Law 369 ( 2d ed. 1983) ("Most courts since 
Homemakers have opted for invalidation not extension."). Here, 
state legislative judgments are at issue. Because deference to 
~~~~ 
the state is appropriate, invalidation as e~pooed ~d"' extension 




In conclusion, th~ mandates 
the same as other disabilities. nancy 
I 
that employers treat preg-
The California statute at 
issue does not "require" employers to commit an unlawful employ-
ment practice, because employers could comply with both Title VII 
and the California statute by extending guaranteed leave benefits 
to all individuals suffering from disabilities. Nevertheless, 
reading the California statute to require employers to extend 
such benefits to all disabled employees does not comport with the 
probable legislative intent and would impose a potentially great 
burden on employers. Because deference is due the state legisla-
ture, the better approach appears to be to give the California 
logical meaning and find it preempted by Title VII as ----, 
"permitting" e ployers to make unlawful pregnancy-based classifi-
cations and as inconsistent with the goal of equal treatment of 
all disabilities. 
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No. 85-494, California Savings and Loan v. Guerra 
My understanding is that there may well be a Court for 
finding the California pregnancy statute not preempted. There 
are two different theories for reaching this result. I know that 
at least Justice Stevens does not plan to choose between the two. 
The first theory is that the words of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act are ambiguous. The first clause purports to 
treat pregnancy as a sex-based characteristic. Thus, disparate 
impact analysis would normally apply. The second clause states 
that pregnancy shall be treated the same as other disabilities. 
This is at odds with the disparate impact theory, so the statute 
is ambiguous. Next, one looks at the legislative history. There 
page L. 
is absolutely no indication that Congress ~anted to prohibit any 
sort of disparate impact analysis on the basis of pregnancy. The 
second clause was merely clarifying that Congress was overruling 
Gilbert, and that pregnancy could not be treated any worse than 
other disabilities. As to the California statute, it provides a 
benefit to pregnant women. It does not burden men because of 
their sex. For example, an employer would be allowed to estab-
lish a sickle cell anemia testing program for its employees with-
out violating Title VII. Treating pregnancy more favorably is 
the same type of thing. The theory of trye California statute is 
procreative freedom. As such, the California statute is not in 
conflict with Title VII, which seeks equal employment opportuni-
ty. As to the preemption provisions of Title VII, they were 
added to limit preemption, not to expand it. The purpose of 
Title VII is to expand employment opportunity. That is the same 
purpose behind the California statute. Thus, the California 
statute is not inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII. 
The second theory proceeds on the assumption that Title 
VII mandates that pregnancy be treated the same as other disabil-
ities. Even assuming this interpretation, Title VII does not 
preempt the California statute because an employer can comply 
with both statutes. The purpose of Title VII is equal employment 
opportunity, and the California statute promotes this. If the 
necessary result of the intersection of the two statutes is that 
employers must extend disability benefits to cover all disabil-
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-494 
CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-
CIATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MARK GUERRA, 
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOY-
MENT AND HOUSING ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1986] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978, pre-empts a state statute that re-
quires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to em-
ployees disabled by pregnancy. · 
I 
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), 
Cal. Gov't Code Ann. § 12900 et seq. (West 1980 and Supp. 
1985-1986), is a comprehensive statute that prohibits dis- · 
crimination in employment and housing. In September 
1978, California amended the FEHA to proscribe certain 
fonns of employinent discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy. See Cal. Labor Code Ann. § 1420.35, 1978 Cal. Stats. 
ch. 1321, § 1, p. 4320-4322, now codified at Cal. Gov't Code 
Ann. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). 1 Subsection (b)(2)-the pro-
1 Section 12945(b)(2) provides, in relevant part: 
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona 
fide occupational qualification: 
"(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .... 
f/1i ~ Dr II 10\__ L C\1\.,t ~·vlA 
yo~ ~31')- f1<-e- di<;~ . 
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vision at issue here-is the only portion of the statute that 
applies to employers subject to Title VII. See § 12945(e). 2 
It requires these employers to provide female employees an 
unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months. Re-
spondent Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the 
state agency authorized to interpret the FEHA, 3 has con-
"(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of 
time; provided, such period shall not exceed four months. . . . Reasonable 
period of time means that period during which the female employee is dis-
abled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions. . . . " 
"An employer may require any employee who plans to take a leave pur-
suant to this section to give reasonable notice of the date such leave shall 
commence and the estimated duration of such leave." 
Originally, the statute was intended to reverse, as to California employ-
ers, the rule established by this Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). At the time, California law prohibited 
school districts from discriminating on the basis of pregnancy, see former 
Cal. Labor Code Ann. § 1420.2, now codified at Cal. Gov't Code Ann. 
§ 12943 (West 1980). The first version of§ 12945 simply imposed this re-
quirement on all California employers with five or more employees. As a · 
result of employer opposition, however, the measure was amended to in-
clude the various provisions now found in § 12945. 
2 Aware that legislation on this subject was pending before Congress, 
the State Legislature added the following section: 
"In the event Congress enacts legislation amending Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, 
the provisions of this act, except paragraph (2) of subsection (b) .. . shall 
be inapplicable to any employer subject to such federal laws .... " 1978 
Cal. Stats. ch. 1321, § 4, p. 4322. 
When Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, this sec-
tion rendered the state law, except subsection (b)(2), invalid as applied to 
all employers covered by Title VII. California subsequently adopted sub-
section (e), which provides: 
"The provisions of this section, except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), 
shall be inapplicable to any employer subject to Title VII of the federal 
Civil Rights Act of 1964." 
3 See Cal. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 12935(a)(l) and 12935(h). Respondent 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing is the state agency charged 
with enforcing the FEHA. See § 12930. 
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strued § 12945(b)(2) to require California employers to rein-
state an employee returning from such pregnancy leave to 
the job she previously held, unless it is no longer available 
due to business necessity. In the latter case, the employer 
must make a reasonable, good faith effort to place the em-
ployee in a substantially similar job. 4 The statute does not 
compel employers to provide paid leave to pregnant employ-
ees. Because unpaid leave is meaningless unless there is a 
job to which to return, the only benefit pregnant workers ac-
tually derive from § 12945(b)(2) is a qualified right to 
reinstatement. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e et seq., also prohibits various forms of employment 
discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex. 
However, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 
(1976), this Court ruled that discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII. 5 In 
• The parties have stipulated that the Commission's interpretation of 
§ 12945(b)(2) is set forth in its proposed regulation, Cal. Admin. Code tit. 2, 
§ 7291.2. See ~so Matter of the Accusation of the Department of Fair 
Employment and Housing v. Travel Express, Case No. FEP80-81 
A7-0992s N18709 (May 26, 1983) (precedential Commission decision con-
struing § 12945(b)(2)). 
5 In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Court held that an otherwise 
comprehensive disability insurance plan·did not violate Title VII because it 
failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities. Relying on Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U. S. 484 (1974), which upheld a similar plan against a Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection challenge, the Court concluded that 
removing pregnancy from the list of compensable' disabilities was not dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. 429 U. S., at 133-136. The Court further 
held that "(a]s there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to 
men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discrimina-
tory effect in this scheme . . .. " /d., at 138. 
Three members of the Court dissented. See id., at 146 (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting); id. , at 160 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices 
would have held that the employer's disability plan discriminated on the 
basis of sex by giving men protection for all categories of risk but giving 
women only partial protection. 
--~-----· ~-· · 
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response to the Gilbert decision, Congress passed the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e(k). The PDA specifies that sex discrimination in-
cludes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 6 
II 
Petitioner California Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion (Cal Fed) is a federally chartered savings and loan asso-
ciation based in Los Angeles; it is an employer covered by 
both Title VII and § 12945(b)(2). Cal Fed has a facially neu-
tral leave policy that permits employees who have completed 
three months of service to take unpaid leave of absence for a 
variety of reasons, including disability and pregnancy. Al-
though it is Cal Fed's policy to try to provide an employee 
taking unpaid leave with a similar position upon returning, 
Cal Fed expressly reserves the right to terminate an em-
ployee who has taken a leave of absence if a similar position is 
not available. 
Lillian Garland was employed by Cal Fed as a receptionist 
for several years. In January 1982 she took a pregnancy dis-
ability leave. When she was able to return to work in April 
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136, 143-146 (1977), the Court 
relied on Gilbert to uphold an employer's sick-leave policy that excluded 
pregnancy. 
8 The PDA added subsection (k) to § 701, the definitional section of Title 
VII. Subsection (k) provides, in relevant part: 
"The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment re-
lated purposes, including the receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similarly situated in their 
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall 
be interpreted to permit otherwise." 
The legislative history of the PDA reflects Congress' approval of the views 
of the dissenters in Gilbert. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock 
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of that year, Garland notified Cal Fed, but was informed that 
her job had been filled and that there were no receptionist or 
similar positions available. Garland filed a complaint with 
respondent Department of Fair Employment and Housing, 
which issued an administrative accusation against Cal Fed on 
her behalf. 7 Respondent charged Cal Fed with violating 
§ 12945(b)(2) of the FEHA. Prior to the scheduled hearing 
before respondent Fair Housing and Employment Commis-
sion, Cal Fed, joined by petitioners Merchants and Manufac-
turers Association and the California Chamber of Com-
merce, 8 brought this action in the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California. They sought a 
declaration that § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent with and pre-
empted by Title VII and an injunction against enforcement of 
the section. 9 In an unreported decision, the District Court 
granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Citing 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 
. U. S. 669 (1983), 10 the court stated that "California employers. 
1 Cal Fed reinstated Garland in a receptionist position in November 
1982, seven months after she first notified it that she was able to return to 
work. 
8 Petitioner Merchants and Manufacturers Association is a trade associ-
ation that represents numerous employers throughout the State of Califor-
nia. Petitioner California Chamber of Commerce also represents many 
California businesses. Both organizations have members that are subject 
to both Title VII and § 12945(b)(2) and have disability leave policies similar 
to Cal Fed's. 
9 Petitioners' complaint also alleged that the California disability leave 
. statute was pre-.empted by § 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). The parties stipulated that 
the petitioners' ERISA claim would be dismissed without prejudice. App. 
9-10. 
10 In Newport News, the Court evaluated a health insurance plan that 
provided female employees with benefits for pregnancy-related conditions 
to the same extent as for other medical conditions, but provided less exten-
sive pregnancy benefits for spouses of male employees. The Court found 
that this limitation discriminated against male employees with respect to 
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment in 
violation § 703(a)(l) of Title VII. "The 1978 Act [the PDA] makes clear 
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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who comply with state law are subject to reverse discrimina-
tion suits brought by temporarily disabled males who do not 
receive the same treatment as female employees disabled by 
pregnancy . . . . " On this basis, the District Court held that 
"California state law and the policies of interpretation and en-
forcement . . . which require preferential treatment of fe-
male employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions are preempted by Title VII and are null, 
void, invalid and inoperative under the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution." !I 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed. 758 F. 2d 390 (1985). It held that "the district 
court's conclusion that section 12945(b)(2) discriminates 
against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common sense, 
misinterprets case law and flouts Title VII and the PDA." 
!d., at 393 (footnote omitted). Based on its own reading of 
NetVport News, the Court of Appeals found that the PDA 
does not "demand that state law be blind to pregnancy's ex-
istence." . I d., at 395. The court held that in enacting the 
PDA Congress intended "to construct a floor beneath which 
pregnancy. disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling 
above which they may not rise." I d., at 396. Because it 
found that the California statute furthers the goal of equal 
employment opportunity for women, the Court of Appeals 
that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favor-
ably than other conditions. Thus petitioner's plan unlawfully gives mar-
ried male employees a benefits package for their dependents that is less 
inclusive than the dependency coverage provided to married female em-
ployees." 462 U. S. , at 684. 
11 After the District Court entered its judgment, Garland moved to inter-
vene pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). The District Court denied 
her motion on several grounds: untimeliness, lack of a "direct and substan-
tial" interest in the litigation, and adequate representation of her interests 
by defendants. Her appeal from the. order denying intervention was con-
solidated with the appeal on the merits. In an unreported order, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention; 
Garland did not seek review of that decision here. 
-====~--========~~========~~~====~--~~~--====~ -·-:---~~::: .. ~-:-:---- - - - ~--
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concluded: "Title VII does not preempt a state law that guar-
antees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy dis-
ability leave days, because this is neither inconsistent with, 
nor unlawful under, Title VII." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1986), and we now 
affirm. 
III 
In determining whether a state statute is pre-empted by 
federal law and therefore invalid under the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, our sole task is to ascertain the 
intent of Congress. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
U. S. 85, 95 (1983); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 
497, 504 (1978). Federal law may supersede state law in 
several different ways. First, when acting within constitu-
tional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law 
by so stating in express terms. E. g., Jones v. Rath Pack-
ing Co., 430 U. S: 519, 525 (1977). Second, congressional in-
tent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be in-
ferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently 
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress "left no room" for supplementary state regulation. 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). 
Neither of these bases for pre-emption exists in this case. 
Congress has explicitly disclaimed any intent to categorically 
pre-empt state law or to "occupy the field" of employment 
discriminationlaw. See42U. S.C. §§2000e-7and2000h-4. 
As a third alternative, in those areas where Congress has 
not completely displaced state regulation, federal law may 
nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent it actually con-
flicts with federal law. Such a conflict occurs either because 
"compliance with both federal and state regulations is a phys-
ical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or because the state law 
stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purpose and objectives of Congress." Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See Michigan Canners 
:·_:::;-=========~====~==--=====-===:::=::=:-::-. :-. --,.,:-: ...---:_::,-. ===- --,=. - --- -··-··--=::-:::.-:=-. - ·-·· 
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& Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining 
Board, 467 U. S. 461, 478 (1984); Fidelity Federal Savings & 
Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156 (1982). Nev-
ertheless, pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed. See 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981). -
This third basis for pre-emption is at issue in this case. In 
two sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, § 708 and § 1104, 
Congress has indicated that state laws will be pre-empted 
only if they actually conflict with federal law. Section 708 of 
Title VII provides: 
"Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or re-
lieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or 
punishment provided by any present or future law of any 
State or political subdivision of a State, other than any 
such law which purports to require or permit the doing 
of any act which would be an unlawful employment prac-
tice under this title." § 2000e-7 · 
Section 1104 of Title XI, applicable to all titles of the Civil 
Rights Act, establishes the following standard for pre-
emption: 
"Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be con-
strued as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to 
occupy. the .field in which any such title operates to the 
exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor 
shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidat-
ing any provision of State law unless such provision is in-
consistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any 
provision thereof." § 2000h-4 
Accordingly, there is no need to infer congressional intent to 
pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of Title 
VII; these two sections provide a "reliable indicium of con-
gressional intent with respect to state authority" to regulate 
employment practice. Malone v. White Motor Corp., supra, 
at 505. We therefore must consider whether § 12945 "re-
- -----~--------------------------~----------------------------------------
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quires or permits" employers to violate Title VII or is incon-
sistent with the purposes of Title VII. 
A 
We turn first to § 708, the statutory provision specifically 
addressed to pre-emption under Title VII. The House Re-
port on the bill from which the language of§ 708 was drawn 
indicates that this section "might be called an anti-preemp-
tion provision." H. R. Rep. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 
p. 3 (1962). Instead of pre-empting state fair employment 
laws, § 708 "'simply left them where they were before the en-
actment of Title VII."' Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
supra, at 103 n. 24 (quoting Pervel Industries, Inc. v. 
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights & Opportuni-
ties, 468 F. Supp. 490, 493 (Conn. 1978), affirmance order, 
603 F. 2d 214 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1031 
(1980)). The narrow scope of pre-emption available under 
§ 708 reflects the importance Congress attached to state anti-
discrimination laws in achieving Title VII's goal of equal em-
ployment opportunity. See generally Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., supra, at 101-102; Kremer v. Chemical Con-
struction Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 468-469, 472, 477 (1982); New 
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 63-65 
(1980). 12 The legislative history of the PDA also supports a 
narrow interpretation of § 708. 13 Applying these principles 
in Shaw, we concluded that Title VII did not pre-empt a New 
11 For example, where state or local law prohibits an employment prac-
tice, § 706(c) requires deferral of federal enforcement until state or local of-
ficials have an opportunity "to act under such State or local law to remedy 
the practice alleged." § 2000e-5(c). 
11 See, e. g, S. Rep. No. 95-331, p. 3 n. 1 (1977) (state laws prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy would not be pre-empted, "(s]ince 
title VII does not 'pre-empt State laws which would not require violating 
title VII"), Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
'1978 (Committee Print prepared for the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources), p. 40 (1979) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.); 123 Gong. Rec . 
. 29643 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (state laws that create a "clear con-
flict" would be pre-empted). 
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York statute which proscribed discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy as sex discrimination, at a time when Title VII did 
not equate the two. 463 U. S. , at 100-104. 
Petitioners contend that the PDA requires equal treatment 
of pregnancy and other disabilities. Their argument rests on 
an excessively literal reading of the second clause of the Act: 
"[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions shall be treated the same for all employment 
related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but 
similarly situated in their ability or inability to work." 
§ 2000e(k). They argue that, because Title VII forbids an 
employer to treat a pregnant employee any differently than 
other disabled employees and because, whatever an employ-
er's leave and reinstatement policy for disabled employees 
generally, § 12945(b)(2) requires employers to provide rea-
sonable unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers, 
the California statute requires them to violate Title VII, as 
amended by the PDA. 
Even if we construed the PDA to require employers to 
treat pregnancy no better than other disabilities, the Califor-
nia statute in no way "requires" employers to violate Title 
VII. 14 If the federal statute forbids employers to provide un-
paid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers and not to 
other disabled employees, a question we address below, 
§ 12945(b)(2) does not prevent employers from complying 
with federal as well as the state law simply by raising the 
level of benefits to other disabled employees. This is not a 
case where "compliance with both federal and state regula-
tions is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where 
there is an "inevitable collision between the two schemes of 
14 Because the California statute is couched in mandatory rather than 
permissive terms, the issue is whether it is pre-empted because it requires 
rather than permits employers to violate Title VII. Cf. Michigan Can-
ners & Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing and Board, 467 U. S. 
461, 478 n. 21 (1984). 
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regulation." Id., at 143. Section 12945(b)(2) does not com-
pel California employers to treat pregnant workers better 
than other disabled employees; it merely establishes benefits 
that employers must, at a minimum, provide to pregnant 
workers. Employers are free to extend comparable benefits 
to other disabled employees, thereby treating "women af-
fected by pregnancy" the same as "other persons not so af-
fected but similarly situated in their ability or inability to 
work." 15 
We recognize that reading the state and federal statutes 
together in this fashion may yield a result that neither stat-
ute independently requires. Whenever there is concurrent 
state and federal regulation in a particular area, however, 
the intersection of the two layers of regulation may have re-
sults different from those intended by either of the regulating 
authorities. 16 Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 
437 U. S. 117, 131 n. 22 (1978) (state statute requiring oil re-
finers to give "voluntary allowances" to service stations not 
pre-empted despite the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act 
may compel its extension to out-of-state stations). In the 
Title VII context, such a result is the logical consequence of 
Congress' decision to allow the States a significant role in the 
formulation of antidiscrimination law. Each government is 
allowed to pursue its own policy. The State's decision that 
equal employment opportunity for pregnant workers re-
quires at a minimum reasonable unpaid leave with job protec-
15 Indeed, at oral argument, petitioners conceded that compliance with 
both "is theoretically possible." Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. 
" Moreover, Congress and the California Legislature were each aware in 
general terms of the ·regulatory scheme adopted by the other when they 
enacted their legislation. California recognized that many of its provisions 
would be pre-empted by the PDA and, accordingly, exempted employers 
covered by Title VII from all portions of the statute except those guaran-
teeing unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers. Congress 
was aware that some state laws mandated certain benefits for pregnant 
workers, but did not indicate that they would be pre-empted by federal 
law. See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 29387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
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tion is given effect, as is the federal government's policy of 
equal treatment. 
Petitioners argue that "extension" of the state statute to 
cover other employees is inappropriate in the absence of a 
- clear indication that this is what the California legislature in-
tended. They cite cases in which this Court has declined to 
rewrite underinclusive state statutes found to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., Wrengler v. Druggists 
Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 152-153 (1980); Caban 
v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 392-393 n. 13 (1979). This ar-
gument is beside the point. Extension is a remedial option 
to be exercised by a court once a statute is found to be 
invalid. See, e. g., Califano v. Wescott, 443 U. S. 76, 89 
(1979) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)). Since the stat-
ute does not require that pregnant workers be treated 
differently, we need not address the relative merits of exten-
sion and nullification. 
B 
Having determined that the California statute does not re-
quire an employer to violate Title VII and is therefore not 
pre-empted under § 708, we next consider whether it is pre-
empted under § 1104. The legislative history indicates that 
this section, like § 708, must be read narrowly. It was not 
intended to extend significantly the scope of pre-emption 
available under § 708. 17 Accordingly, our inquiry is limited 
17 Representative Meader, one of the sponsors of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, proposed the precursor to § 1104 as an amendment to the Civil Rights 
Act, see 110 Cong. Rec. 2788 (1964), because he feared that § 708 and simi-
lar provisions in other titles were "wholly inadequate to preserve the valid-
ity and force of State laws aimed at discrimination." H. R. Rep. No. 914, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 59 (1963) (additional views of Hon. George 
Meader). His version provided that state laws would not be pre-empted 
"except to the extent that there is a direct and positive conflict between 
such provisions so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand 
together." 110 Cong. Rec. 2787 !1964). The amendment ultimately 
adopted by Congress was a substitute offered by Rep. Mathias without 
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to whether the state law is fundamentally inconsistent with 
the purposes of Title VII, as amended by the PDA. The 
issue is whether the state statute stands "as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and ob-
jectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 
(1941), and, as always in pre-emption cases, "[t]he purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Malone v. White 
Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks 
v. Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
Petitioners argue that the language of the federal statute 
itself unambiguously rejects California's "special treatment" 
approach to pregnancy discrimination, thus rendering any re-
sort to legislative history unnecessary. Since § 1104 directs 
our inquiry to the purpose of the federal statute, however, 
we must examine the PDA's language against the back-
ground of its legislative history and historical context. As to 
the language of the PDA, "[i]t is a 'familiar rule, that a thing 
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the 
statute, because not within its spirit; nor within the intention 
of its ·makers.'" United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 
443 U. S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. 
United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892)). See Train v. Col- · 
orado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976); 
United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 
543-544 (1940). 
It is well established that the PDA was passed in reaction 
to this Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 
supra. "When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it un-
ambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding 
and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision." 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, 462 
objection from Rep. Meader. !d., at 2789 (1964). There is no indication 
that this substitution altered ~he basic thrust of § 1104. 
Perhaps for these reason, we have in the past relied primarily on § 708 to 
resolve issues of pre-emption under Title VII. See Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 101, 103 (1983). 
--~~--· ::--....... ---~·---··· -
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U. S. 669, 678 (1983). By adding pregnancy to the definition 
of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the first clause 
of the PDA reflects Congress' disapproval of the reasoning in 
Gilbert. Newport News, supra, at 678-679 & n. 17 (citing 
legislative history). Rather than imposing a limitation on 
the remedial purpose of the PDA, we believe that the second 
clause was intended to overrule the holding in Gilbert and to 
illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be rem-
edied. Cf. Newport News, supra, at 678 n. 14 ("The mean-
ing of the first clause is not limited by the second clause, 
which explains the application of the general principle to J 
women employees"); see also id., at. 688 (REHNQUIST, Jt  J., 
dissenting). 18 
The context in which Congress considered the issue of 
pregnancy discrimination supports a view of the PDA as a 
floor, rather than a ceiling, for pregnancy benefits. Con-
gress had before it extensive evidence of discrimination 
against pregnancy, particularly in disability and health insur-
ance programs like those challenged in Gilbert and Nashville 
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136 (1977). 19 The reports, de-
bates, and hearings make abundantly clear that Congress in-
tended the PDA to provide relief for working women and to 
18 Several commentators have construed the second clause of the PDA in 
this way. See, e. g., Note, Employment Equality Under The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale L. J. 929, 937 (1985); Note, Sexual 
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 690, 
696 & n. 26 (1983). 
11 See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977, Hearings on 
S. 995 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on 
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 31-33 (1977) (statement of Vice 
Chairman Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Ethel Bent 
Walsh); id., at 113-117 (statement of Wendy W. Williams); id., at 117-121 
(statement of Susan Deller Ross); id., at 307-310 (statement of Bella S. 
· Abzug). See also Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis 
of Pregnancy, 1977, Hearings on H. R. 5055 and H. R. 6075 before the 
Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
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end discrimination against pregnant workers. 20 In contrast 
to the thorough account of discrimination against pregnant 
workers, the legislative history is devoid of any discussion of 
preferential treatment of pregnancy, beyond acknowledg-
ments of the existence of state statutes providing for such 
preferential treatment. See infra, at --. Opposition to 
the PDA came from those concerned with the cost of includ-
ing pregnancy in health and disability benefit plans and the 
application of the bill to abortion, 21 not from those who fa-
vored special accommodation of pregnancy. 
In support of their argument that the PDA prohibits em-
ployment practices that favor pregnant women, ·petitioners 
and several amici cite statements in the legislative history to 
the effect that the PDA does not require empl.oyers to extend 
any benefits to pregnant women that they do not already pro-
vide to other disabled employees. For example, the House 
Report explained that the proposed legislation "does not re-
quire employers to treat pregnant employees in any particu-
lar manner . . . . H. R. 6075 in n'o way requires the institu-
tion of any new programs where none currently exist." 22 We 
20 See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 8144 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bay h) (legisla-
tion ''will end employment discrimination against pregnant workers"); 124 
Cong Rec. 21446 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Chisholm) (bill "affords some 41 
percent of this Nation's labor force some greater degree of protection and 
security without fear of reprisal due to to their decision to bear children"); 
id., at 21442 (remarks of Rep. Tsongas) (bill "would put an end to an unre-
alistic and unfair system that forces women to choose between family and 
career-dearly a function of sex bias in the law"); id., at 36818 (remarks of 
Sen. Javits) (the "bill represents only basic fairness for women employ-
ees"); id., at 38574 (remarks of Rep. Sarasin) (my subcommittee "learned 
of the many instances of discrimination against pregnant workers, as we 
learned of the hardships this discrimination brought to women and their 
families"). 
n See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-331, p. 9 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 46 (discuss-
ing cost objections); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1786, pp. 3-4 (1978), Leg. 
Hist., at 196-197 (application of the PDA to abortion). 
21 H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, p. at 4 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 150. See also S. 
Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 4, Leg. Hist., at 41; 123 Cong. Rec. 7540 (1977) 
85-494---0PINION , 
16 CALIFORNIA FEDERALS. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA 
do not interpret these references to support petitioners' con-
struction of the statute. On the contrary, if Congress had 
intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it would have 
been the height of understatement to say only that the legis-
lation would not require such conduct. It is hardly conceiv-
able that Congress would have extensively discussed only its 
intent not to require preferential treatment if in fact it had 
intended to prohibit such treatment. 
We also find it significant that Congress was aware of state 
laws similar to California's but apparently did not consider 
them inconsistent with the PDA. In the debates and reports 
on the bill, Congress repeatedly acknowledged the existence 
of state antidiscrimination laws that prohibit sex discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy. 23 Two of the States men-
tioned then required employers to provide reasonable leave 
to pregnant workers. 24 After citing these state laws, Con-
(remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 10582 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins); 
id., at 28387 (remarks of Sen. Javits); iif,., at 29664 (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke). 
23 See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 29387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits) , Leg. 
Hist., at 67 ("several state legislatures . . . have chosen to address the 
problem by mandating certain types of benefits for pregnant employees"). 
See also S. Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 3, Leg. Hist., at 40; H. R. Rep. 
No. 95-948, supra, at 10-11, Leg. Hist., at 156-157; 123 Cong. Rec. 29648 
(1977) (list of states that require coverage for pregnancy and pregnancy-
related disabilities); id., at 29662 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
"'See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-126(g) (1977), now codified at § 45a-
60(a)(7) (1985); Mont. Rev. Codes § 41-2602 (Smith Supp. 1977), now codi-
fied at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-310 and 49-2-311 (West 1985). The 
Connecticut statute provided, in relevant part: 
"It shall be an unfair employment practice 
"(g) For any employer . .. (ii) to refuse to grant to [a pregnant] employee 
a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from such preg-
nancy. . . . . Upon signifying her intent to return, such employee shall be 
reinstated to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent 
pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other serv-
ice credits unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's circum-
stances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so." 
·-:----- --- ,-:.:._- ----------
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gress failed to evince the requisite "clear and manifest pur-
pose" to supersede them. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development 
Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 206 (1983). To the contrary, both 
the House and Senate Reports suggest that these laws would 
continue to have effect under the PDA. 25 
Title VII, as amended by the PDA, and California's preg-
nancy disability leave statute share a common goal. The 
purpose of Title VII is "to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that had operated in the 
past to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over 
other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 
424, 429-430 (1971). See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 
U. S. 69, 75 n. 7 (1984); Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973). Rather than limiting exist-
ing Title VII principles and objectives, the PDA extends 
them to cover pregnancy. 26 As Senator Williams, a sponsor 
of the Act, stated: "The entire thrust . . . behind this legisla-
tion is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully 
in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental 
right to full participation in family life." 123 Cong. Rec. 
29658 (1977). 
The Montana statute was virtually identical. Both have been recodified 
in current statutory compilations, but the leave and reinstatement require-
ments are unchanged. 
ill For example, the Senate Report states: "Since title VII does not pre-
empt State laws which would not require violating title VII . . . , these 
States would continue to be able to enforce their State laws if the bill were 
enacted." S. Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 3 n. 1, Leg. Hist., at 40. 
ill "Proponents of the bill repeatedly emphasized that the Supreme Court 
had erroneously interpreted congressional intent and that the amending 
legislation was necessary to reestablish the principles of Title VII law as 
they had been understood prior to the Gilbert decision." Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 679 (1983). 
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Section 12945(b)(2) also promotes equal employment 
opportunity. By requiring employers to reinstate women 
after a reasonable pregnancy disability leave, § 12945(b)(2) 
ensures that they will not lose their jobs on account of preg-
nancy disability. 27 California's approach is consistent with 
the dissenting opinion of JUSTICE BRENNAN in General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, which Congress adopted in enacting the 
PDA. Referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), a 
Title VI decision, JusTICE BRENNAN stated: 
"[D]iscrimination is a social phenomenon encased in a so-
cial context and, therefore, unavoidably takes its mean-
ing from the desired end products of the relevant legisla-
tive enactment, end products that may demand due 
consideration of the uniqueness of the 'disadvantaged' in-
dividuals. A realistic understanding of conditions found 
in today's labor environment warrants taking pregnancy 
·into account in fashioning disability policies." 429 
U. S., at 159 (footnote omitted). 
By "taking pregnancy into account," California's pregnancy 
disability leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have 
families without losing their jobs. 28 
zr As authoritatively construed by respondent Commission, the provision 
will "insure that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medi-
cal conditions have equal employment opportunities as persons not so af-
fected:" Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 2 § 7291.2(c) (proposed regulation). 
28 We emphasize the limited nature of the benefits § 12945(b )(2) provides. 
The California statute is not based on stereotypes or generalizations about 
the needs and abilities of pregnant workers. · Such stereotypical assump-
tions would be inconsistent with equal employment opportunity for women.; 
''if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender 
because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be 
innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate." Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 725 (1982). See also Los Angeles 
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 709 (1978); Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U. S. 542, 545 (1971) (MARSHALL, J., concur-
ring). However, § 12945(b)(2) does not reflect archaic or stereotypic 
notions about pregnancy. Disability due to pregnancy is not a stereotype 
and the California statute is narrowly drawn to cover only the period of 
85-494-0PINION 
CALIFORNIA FEDERALS. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA 19 
Thus petitioners' facial challenge to § 12945(b)(2) fails. 
The statute is not pre-empted by Title VII, as amended by 
the PDA, since the two statutory bases for pre-emption are 
lacking in this case. Section 12945(b)(2) does not require the 
doing of an act which is unlawful under Title VII, nor is it 
inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute. 29 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
actual physical disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions. 
It Because we conclude that in enacting the PDA Congress did not intend 
to prohibit all favorable treatment of pregnancy, we need not address 
whether § 12945(b)(2) could be upheld as a legislative response to leave pol-
icies that have a disparate impact on pregnant workers. 
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I would be pleased to join parts I, II, and IIIA of your 
opinion in the above-captioned case. I do not think, however, 
that we need to decide the question addressed in part IIIB, 
whether the California statute "is inconsistent with any of the 
purposes of [the Civil Rights] Act," within the meaning of 
§1104 of Title XI. As I read §708 of Title VII, it provides 
that even if ordinary principles of preemption, as limited by 
§1104-or-Title XI, would lead to the conclusion that a law is 
preempted, it nevertheless will not be preempted unles it also 
meets §708's requirements, i.e., "purports to require or permit 
the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment 
practice under this title." Accordingly, I would replace IIIB 
with something like the following: 
Having determined that the California statute 
does not require an employer to violate Title VII and 
is therefore not preempted under §708, we next 
consider petitioner's contention that it is preempted 
under §1104. We find that contention to be without 
merit. Both §708 and §1104 are, in reality, not 
preemption provisions but anti-preemption provisions. 
Having found that one of them (§708) prevents 
preemption here because the exception to its application 
does not apply, it makes no difference whether the other 
provision (§1104) prevents preemption as well. 
To elaborate: Section 1104 provides, in relevant 
part, that no "provision of this Act [shall be] 
construed as invalidating any provision of State law 
unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the 
purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof" 
(emphasis added). Section 708 of Title VII, however, 
provides that "[n]othing in this title shall be deemed 
to exempt or relieve any person from any liability .. . 
provided by any present or future law of any State .. . 
other than any such law which purports to require or 
permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful 
employment practice under this title" (emphasis added). 
The PDA is a provision of the Civil Rights 
Act. Hence §1104 limits its preemptive scope. 
But it is also a provision of Title VII. Accordingly, 
even if the preemption limitation of §1104 were to 
be found inapplicable (because the California statute 
was inconsistent with the PDA's purposes), the statute 
could still not be deemed preempted unless it 
"purports to require or permit the doing of a[n] act 
which would be an unlawful employment practice under" 
Title VII. We have already concluded that it does 
not. Accordingly, we need not address petitioners' 
contention that California's requirement of unpaid 
leave only for pregnant women amounts to "special 
treatment" at odds with the anti-discrimination purpose 
of the PDA. 
If this approach is adopted, four conforming changes would 
be required: 
-- on p.10, first full paragraph, third line, deletion of 
"excessively," and replacement of "an" with "a"; 
on that same page, next paragraph, first line, replacement 
of "Even if we construed the PDA to require" with "Adopting for 
the sake of argument petitioners' view that the PDA requires"; 
in that same paragraph, sixth line, deletion of the 
parenthetical "a question we address below"; 
-- on p. 19, modification of the next-to-last sentence by 
eliminating "two," changing "bases" to "basis," and "are" to "is," 
and modification of the last sentence by ending it at "Title VII" 
and eliminating footnote 29. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-494 
CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-
CIATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MARK GUERRA, 
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOY-
MENT AND HOUSING ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1986] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978, pre-empts a state statute that re-
quires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to em-
ployees disabled by pregnancy. 
I 
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), 
Cal. Gov't Code Ann. § 12900 et seq. (West 1980 and Supp. 
1986), is a comprehensive statute that prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment and housing. In September 1978, Cali-
fornia amended the FEHA to proscribe certain forms of em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See Cal. 
Labor Code Ann. § 1420.35, 1978 Cal. Stats. ch. 1321, § 1, 
p. 4320-4322, now codified at Cal. Gov't Code Ann. 
§ 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). 1 Subdivision (b)(2)-the provi-
'Section 12945(b)(2) provides, in relevant part: 
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona 
fide occupational qualification: 
"(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . .. . " 
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sion at issue here-is the only portion of the statute that ap-
plies to employers subject to Title VII. See § 12945(e).2 It 
requires these employers to provide female employees an un-
paid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months. Re-
spondent Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the 
state agency authorized to interpret the FEHA,3 has con-
"(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of 
time; provided, such period shall not exceed four months. . . . Reasonable 
period of time means that peri<>Q during which the female employee is 
disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions. . .. " 
"An employer may require any employee who plans to take a leave pur-
suant to this section to give reasonable notice of the date such leave shall 
commence and the estimated duration of such leave." 
Originally, the statute was intended to reverse, as to California employ-
ers, the rule established by this Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). At the time, California law prohibited 
school districts from discriminating on the basis of pregnancy, see former 
Cal. Labor Code Ann. § 1420.2 (1977), now codified at Cal. Gov't Code 
Ann. § 12943 (West 1980). The first version of§ 12945 simply imposed this 
requirement on all California employers with five or more employees. As 
a result of employer opposition, however, the measure was amended to in-
clude the various provisions now found in § 12945. 
2 Aware that legislation on this subject was pending before Congress, 
the State Legislature added the following section: 
"In the event Congress enacts legislation amending Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, 
the provisions of this act, except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) ... shall 
be inapplicable to any employer subject to such federal law .... " 1978 
Cal. Stats. ch. 1321, § 4, p. 4322. 
When Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, this sec-
tion rendered the state law, except subdivision (b)(2), invalid as applied to 
all employers covered by Title VII. California subsequently adopted sub-
division (e), which provides: 
"The provisions of this section, except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), 
shall be inapplicable to any employer subject to Title VII of the federal 
Civil Rights Act of 1964." 
3 See Cal. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 12935(a)(1) and 12935(h). Respondent 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing is the state agency charged 
with enforcing the FEHA. See § 12930. 
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strued § 12945(b )(2) to require California employers to rein-
state an employee returning from such pregnancy leave to 
the job she previously held, unless it is no longer available 
due to business necessity. In the latter case, the employer 
must make a reasonable, good faith effort to place the em-
ployee in a substantially similar job. 4 The statute does not 
compel employers to provide paid leave to pregnant employ-
ees. Because unpaid leave is meaningless unless there is a 
job to which to return, the only benefit pregnant workers 
actually derive from § 12945(b)(2) is a qualified right to 
reinstatement. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e et seq., also prohibits various forms of employment 
discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex. 
However, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 
(1976), this Court ruled that discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII. 5 In 
'The parties have stipulated that the Commission's interpretation of 
§ 12945(b)(2) is set forth in its proposed regulation, Cal. Admin. Code tit. 2, 
§ 7291.2. See also Matter of the Accusation of the Department of Fair 
Employment and Housing v. Travel Express, Case No. FEP80-81 
A7- 0992s N18709 83-17 (Aug. 4, 1983) (precedential Commission decision 
construing § 12945(b)(2)). 
5 In General Electric Co . v. Gilbert, the Court held that an otherwise 
comprehensive disability insurance plan did not violate Title VII because it 
failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities. Relying on Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U. S. 484 (1974) , which upheld a similar plan against a Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection challenge, the Court concluded that 
removing pregnancy from the list of compensable disabilities was not dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. 429 U. S. 125, 133-136 (1976). The Court 
further held that "[a]s there is no proof that the package is in fact worth 
more to men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based dis-
criminatory effect in this scheme .. . . " ld., at 138. 
Three members of the Court dissented. See id., at 146 (BRENNAN, J ., 
dissenting); id., at 160 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) . The dissenting Justices 
would have held that the employer's disability plan discriminated on the 
basis of sex by giving men protection for all categories of risk but giving 
women only partial protection. 
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response to the Gilbert decision, Congress passed the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e(k). The PDA specifies that sex discrimination in-
cludes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 6 
II 
Petitioner California Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion (Cal Fed) is a federally chartered savings and loan asso-
ciation based in Los Angeles; it is an employer covered by 
both Title VII and § 12945(b)(2). Cal Fed has a facially neu-
tral leave policy that permits employees who have completed 
three months of service to take unpaid leave of absence for a 
variety of reasons, including disability and pregnancy. Al-
though it is Cal Fed's policy to try to provide an employee 
taking unpaid leave with a similar position upon returning, 
Cal Fed expressly reserves the right to terminate an em-
ployee who has taken a leave of absence if a similar position is 
not available. 
Lillian Garland was employed by Cal Fed as a receptionist 
for several years. In January 1982, she took a pregnancy 
disability leave. When she was able to return to work in 
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136, 143-146 (1977), the Court 
relied on Gilbert to uphold an employer's sick-leave policy that excluded 
pregnancy. 
6 The PDA added subsection (k) to§ 701, the definitional section of Title 
VII. Subsection (k) provides, in relevant part: 
"The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inabil-
ity to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall be interpreted to 
permit otherwise." 
The legislative history of the PDA reflects Congress' approval of the views 
of the dissenters in Gilbert. See N eurport News Shipbuilding & Dry dock 
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 678-679, and nn. 15-17 (1983) (citing legisla-
tive history). 
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April of that year, Garland notified Cal Fed, but was in-
formed that her job had been filled and that there were no 
receptionist or similar positions available. Garland filed a 
complaint with respondent Department of Fair Employment 
and Housing, which issued an administrative accusation 
against Cal Fed on her behalf. 7 Respondent charged Cal 
Fed with violating§ 12945(b)(2) of the FEHA. Prior to the 
scheduled hearing before respondent Fair Housing and Em-
ployment Commission, Cal Fed, joined by petitioners Mer-
chants and Manufacturers Association and the California 
Chamber of Commerce,8 brought this action in the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California. 
They sought a declaration that § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent 
with and pre-empted by Title VII and an injunction against 
enforcement of the section. 9 The District Court granted pe-
titioners' motion for summary judgment. 33 EPD ~ 34,227, 
34 FEP cases 562 (1984). Citing Newport News Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669 (1983), 10 the 
7 Cal Fed reinstated Garland in a receptionist position in November 
1982, seven months after she first notified it that she was able to return to 
work. 
8 Petitioner Merchants and Manufacturers Association is a trade associ-
ation that represents numerous employers throughout the State of Califor-
nia. Petitioner California Chamber of Commerce also represents many 
California businesses. Both organizations have members that are subject 
to both Title VII and § 12945(b)(2) and have disability-leave policies similar 
to Cal Fed's. 
9 Petitioners' complaint also alleged that the California disability leave 
statute was pre-empted by § 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). The parties stipulated that 
the petitioners' ERISA claim would be dismissed without prejudice. App. 
JA9-JA10, nn. 1, 2. 
10 In Newport News , the Court evaluated a health insurance plan that 
provided female employees with benefits for pregnancy-related conditions 
to the same extent as for other medical conditions, but provided less exten-
sive pregnancy benefits for spouses of male employees. The Court found 
that this limitation discriminated against male employees with respect to 
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment in 
violation § 703(a)(l) of Title VII. "The 1978 Act [the PDA] makes clear 
85-494-0PINION 
6 CALIFORNIA FEDERAL S. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA 
court stated that "California employers who comply with 
state law are subject to reverse discrimination suits under 
Title VII brought by temporarily disabled males who do not 
receive the same treatment as female employees disabled by 
pregnancy .... " On this basis, the District Court held that 
"California state law and the policies of interpretation and en-
forcement . . . which require preferential treatment of fe-
male employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions are preempted by Title VII and are null, 
void, invalid and inoperative under the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution." 33 EPD ~ 34, 227, 34 FEP 
cases at 568. 11 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed. 758 F. 2d 390 (1985). It held that "the district 
court's conclusion that section 12945(b)(2) discriminates 
against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common sense, 
misinterprets case law, and flouts Title VII and the PDA." 
Id., at 393 (footnote omitted). Based on its own reading of 
Newport News, the Court of Appeals found that the PDA 
does not "demand that state law be blind to pregnancy's ex-
istence." Id., at 395. The court held that in enacting the 
PDA Congress intended "to construct a floor beneath which 
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling 
above which they may not rise." Id., at 396. Because it 
that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favor-
ably than other conditions. Thus petitioner's plan unlawfully gives mar-
ried male employees a benefit package for their dependents that is less in-
clusive than the dependency coverage provided to married female 
employees." 462 U. S. , at 684. 
11 After the District Court entered its judgment, Garland moved to inter-
vene pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). The District Court denied 
her motion on several grounds: untimeliness, lack of a "direct and substan-
tial" interest in the litigation, and adequate representation of her interests 
by defendants. Her appeal from the order denying intervention was con-
solidated with the appeal on the merits. In an unreported order, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention; 
Garland did not seek review of that decision here. 
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found that the California statute furthers the goal of equal 
employment opportunity for women, the Court of Appeals 
concluded: "Title VII does not preempt a state law that guar-
antees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy dis-
ability leave days, because this is neither inconsistent with, 
nor unlawful under, Title VII." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. -- (1986), and we now 
affirm. 
III 
In determining whether a state statute is pre-empted by 
federal law and therefore invalid under the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, our sole task is to ascertain the 
intent of Congress. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
U. S. 85, 95 (1983); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 
497, 504 (1978). Federal law may supersede state law in 
several different ways. First, when acting within constitu-
tional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law 
by so stating in express terms. E. g., Jones v. Rath Pack-
ing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977). Second, congressional in-
tent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be in-
ferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently 
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress "left no room" for supplementary state regulation. 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). 
Neither of these bases for pre-emption exists in this case. 
Congress has explicitly disclaimed any intent to categorically 
pre-empt state law or to "occupy the field" of employment 
discriminationlaw. See42U. S.C. §§2000e-7and2000h-4. 
As a third alternative, in those areas where Congress has 
not completely displaced state regulation, federal law may 
nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent it actually con-
flicts with federal law. Such a conflict occurs either because 
"compliance with both federal and state regulations is a phys-
ical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or because the state law 
stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
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of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See Michigan Canners 
& Freezers Assn. Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bar-
gaining Bd., 467 U. S. 461, 478 (1984); Fidelity Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 156 (1982). 
Nevertheless, pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed. 
See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981). 
This third basis for pre-emption is at issue in this case. In 
two sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, §§ 708 and 1104, 
Congress has indicated that state laws will be pre-empted 
only if they actually conflict with federal law. Section 708 of 
Title VII provides: 
"Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or re-
lieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or 
punishment provided by any present or future law of any 
State or political subdivision of a State, other than any 
such law which purports to require or permit the doing 
of any act which would be an unlawful employment prac-
tice under this title." § 2000e-7 
Section 1104 of Title XI, applicable to all titles of the Civil 
Rights Act, establishes the following standard for pre-
emption: 
"Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be con-
strued as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to 
occupy the field in which any such title operates to the 
exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor 
shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidat-
ing any provision of State law unless such provision is in-
consistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any 
provision thereof." § 2000h-4 
Accordingly, there is no need to infer congressional intent to 
pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of Title 
VII; these two sections provide a "reliable indicium of con-
gressional intent with respect to state authority" to regulate 
employment practice. Malone v. White Motor Corp., supra, 
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at 505. We therefore must consider whether § 12945(b)(2) 
"requires or permits" employers to violate Title VII or is in-
consistent with the purposes of Title VII. 
A 
We turn first to § 708, the statutory provision specifically 
addressed to pre-emption under Title VII. The House Re-
port on the bill from which the language of § 708 was drawn 
indicates that this section "might be called an antipreemption 
provision." H. R. Rep. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 
p. 14 (1962). Instead of pre-empting state fair employment 
laws, § 708 "'simply left them where they were before the en-
actment of Title VII.'" Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
supra, at 103, n. 24 (quoting Pervel Industries, Inc. v. 
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportuni-
ties, 468 F. Supp. 490, 493 (Conn. 1978), affirmance order, 
603 F. 2d 214 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1031 
(1980)). The narrow scope of pre-emption available under 
§ 708 reflects the importance Congress attached to state anti-
discrimination laws in achieving Title VII's goal of equal em-
ployment opportunity. See generally Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U. S., at 101-102; Kremer v. Chemical Con-
struction Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 468-469, 472, 477 (1982); New 
York Gaslight Club, Inc . v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 63-65 
(1980). 12 The legislative history of the PDA also supports a 
narrow interpretation of § 708. 13 Applying these principles 
12 For example, where state or local law prohibits an employment prac-
tice, § 706(c) requires deferral of federal enforcement until state or local of-
ficials have an opportunity "to act under such State or local law to remedy 
the practice alleged." § 2000e-5(d). 
13 See, e. g, S. Rep. No. 95-331, p. 3, n. 1 (1977) (state laws prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy would not be pre-empted, "[s]ince 
title VII does not pre-empt State laws which would not require violating 
title VII"), Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978 (Committee Print prepared for the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources), p. 40 (1980) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.); 123 Cong. Rec. 
29643 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (state laws that create a "clear con-
flict" would be pre-empted). 
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in Shaw, we concluded that Title VII did not pre-empt a New 
York statute which proscribed discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy as sex discrimination, at a time when Title VII did 
not equate the two. 463 U. S., at 100-104. J 
Petitioners contend that the second clause of the PDA re-
quires equal treatment of pregnancy and other disabilities. 
They argue that, because Title VII forbids an employer to 
treat a pregnant employee any differently than other dis-
abled employees and because, whatever an employer's leave 
and reinstatement policy for disabled employees generally, 
§ 12945(b)(2) requires employers to provide reasonable un-
paid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers, the Cali-
fornia statute requires them to violate Title VII, as amended 
by the PDA. 
Adopting for the sake of argument petitioners' view that 
the PDA requires employers to treat pregnancy no better 
than other disabilities, the California statute in no way "re-
quires" employers to violate Title VII. 14 If the federal stat-
ute forbids employers to provide unpaid leave and reinstate-
ment to pregnant workers and not to other disabled 
employees, a question we address below, § 12945(b)(2) does 
not prevent employers from complying with federal as well as 
the state law simply by raising the level of benefits to other 
disabled employees. This is not a case where "compliance 
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossi-
bility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 
•• Petitioners assert that even if§ 12945(b)(2) does not require employers 
to treat pregnant employees differently from other disabled employees, it 
permits employers to do so because it does not specifically prohibit differ-
ent treatment. If we were to interpret the term "permit" as expansively 
as petitioners suggest, however, the State would be required to incorpo-
rate every prohibition contained in Title VII into its state law, since it 
would otherwise be held to "permit" any employer action it did not ex-
pressly prohibit. We conclude that "permit" in § 708 must be interpreted 
to pre-empt only those state laws that expressly sanction a practice unlaw-
ful under Title VII; the term does not pre-empt state laws that are silent 
on the practice. 
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U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where there is an "inevitable 
collision between the two schemes of regulation." I d., at 
143. Section 12945(b)(2) does not compel California employ-
ers to treat pregnant workers better than other disabled em-
ployees; it merely establishes benefits that employers must, 
at a minimum, provide to pregnant workers. Employers are 
free to extend comparable benefits to other disabled employ-
ees, thereby treating "women affected by pregnancy" the 
same as "other persons not so affected but similarly situated 
in their ability or inability to work." 15 
We recognize that reading the state and federal statutes 
together in this fashion may yield a result that neither stat-
ute independently requires. Whenever there is concurrent 
state and federal regulation in a particular area, however, 
the intersection of the two layers of regulation may have re-
sults different from those intended by either of the regulating 
authorities. 16 Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 
437 U. S. 117, 131, n. 22 (1978) (state statute requiring oil re-
finers to give a "voluntary allowance" to service stations not 
pre-empted despite the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act 
may compel its extension to out-of-state stations). In the 
Title VII context, such a result is the logical consequence of 
Congress' decision to allow the States a significant role in the 
formulation of antidiscrimination law. Each government is 
allowed to pursue its own policy. The State's decision that 
equal employment opportunity for pregnant workers re-
16 Indeed, at oral argument, petitioners conceded that compliance with 
both "is theoretically possible." Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. 
16 Moreover, Congress and the California Legislature were each aware in 
general terms of the regulatory scheme adopted by the other when they 
enacted their legislation. California recognized that many of its provisions 
would be pre-empted by the PDA and, accordingly, exempted employers 
covered by Title VII from all portions of the statute except those guaran-
teeing unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant workers. Congress 
was aware that some state laws mandated certain benefits for pregnant 
workers, but did not indicate that they would be pre-empted by federal 
law. See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 29387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
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quires at a minimum reasonable unpaid leave with job protec-
tion is given effect, as is the Federal Government's policy of 
equal treatment. 
Petitioners argue that "extension" of the state statute to 
cover other employees is inappropriate in the absence of a 
clear indication that this is what the California Legislature 
intended. They cite cases in which this Court has declined 
to rewrite underinclusive state statutes found to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., Wrengler v. Druggists 
Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 152-153 (1980); Caban 
v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 392-393, n. 13 (1979). This 
argument is beside the point. Extension is a remedial option 
to be exercised by a court once a statute is found to be 
invalid. See, e. g., Califano v. Wescott, 443 U. S. 76, 89 
(1979) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)). Since the stat-
ute does not require that pregnant workers be treated 
differently, we need not address the relative merits of exten-
sion and nullification. 
B 
Having determined that the California statute does not re-
quire an employer to violate Title VII and is therefore not 
pre-empted under § 708, we next consider whether it is pre-
empted under § 1104. The legislative history indicates that 
this section, like § 708, must be read narrowly. It was not 
intended to extend significantly the scope of pre-emption 
available under § 708. 17 Accordingly, our inquiry is limited 
17 Representative Meader, one of the sponsors of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, proposed the precursor to § 1104 as an amendment to the Civil Rights 
Act, see 110 Cong. Rec. 2788 (1964), because he feared that § 708 and simi-
lar provisions in other titles were "wholly inadequate to preserve the valid-
ity and force of State laws aimed at discrimination." H. R. Rep. No. 914, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 59 (1963) (additional views of Hon. George 
Meader). His version provided that state laws would not be pre-empted 
"except to the extent that there is a direct and positive conflict between 
such provisions so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand 
together." 110 Cong. Rec. 2787 (1964). The amendment ultimately 
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to whether the state law is fundamentally inconsistent with 
the purposes of Title VII, as amended by the PDA. The 
issue is whether the state statute stands "as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and ob-
jectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 
(1941), and, as always in pre-emption cases, "[t]he purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Malone v. White 
Motor Corp., 435 U. S., at 504 (quoting Retail Clerks v. 
Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
Petitioners argue that the language of the federal statute 
itself unambiguously rejects California's "special treatment" 
approach to pregnancy discrimination, thus rendering any re-
sort to legislative history unnecessary. Since § 1104 directs 
our inquiry to the purpose of the federal statute, however, 
we must examine the PDA's language against the back-
ground of its legislative history and historical context. As to 
the language of the PDA, "'[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing 
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the 
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention 
of its makers."' Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 201 
(1979) (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 
143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892)). See Train v. Colorado Public In-
terest Research Group, Inc., 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976); United 
States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 
(1940). 
It is well established that the PDA was passed in reaction 
to this Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. 
"When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambigu-
ously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the 
reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision." Newport 
adopted by Congress was a substitute offered by Rep. Mathias without 
objection from Rep. Meader. !d., at 2789. There is no indication that 
this substitution altered the basic thrust of § 1104. 
Perhaps for these reasons, we have in the past relied primarily on § 708 
to resolve issues of pre-emption under Title VII . See Shaw v. Delta A ir 
Lines, Inc ., 463 U. S. 85, 101, 103 (1983). 
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News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. 8., at 
678. By adding pregnancy to the definition of sex dis-
crimination prohibited by Title VII, the first clause of the 
PDA reflects Congress' disapproval of the reasoning in Gil-
bert. Neu;port News, supra, at 678-679, and n. 17 (citing 
legislative history). Rather than imposing a limitation on 
the remedial purpose of the PDA, we believe that the second 
clause was intended to overrule the holding in Gilbert and to 
illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be rem-
edied. Cf. 462 U. 8., at 678, n. 14 ("The meaning of the first 
clause is not limited by the specific language in the second 
clause, which explains the application of the general principle 
to women employees"); see also id., at 688 (REHNQUIST, J., 
dissenting). 18 
The context in which Congress considered the issue of 
pregnancy discrimination supports a view of the PDA as a 
floor, rather than a ceiling, for pregnancy benefits. Con-
gress had before it extensive evidence of discrimination 
against pregnancy, particularly in disability and health insur-
ance programs like those challenged in Gilbert and Nashville 
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136 (1977). 19 The reports, de-
bates, and hearings make abundantly clear that Congress in-
tended the PDA to provide relief for working women and to 
'
8 Several commentators have construed the second clause of the PDA in 
this way. See, e. g., Note, Employment Equality Under The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale L. J. 929, 937 (1985); Note, Sexual 
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 690, 
696, and n. 26 (1983). 
'"See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977, Hearings on 
S. 995 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on 
Human Resources, 95th Cong. , 1st Sess., pp. 31-33 (1977) (statement of 
Vice Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Ethel Bent 
Walsh); id., at 113-117 (statement of Wendy W. Williams); id., at 117-121 
(statement of Susan Deller Ross); id. , at 307-310 (statement of Bella S. 
Abzug). See also Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis 
of Pregnancy, Hearings on H. R. 5055 and H. R. 6075 before the Sub-
committee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
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end discrimination against pregnant workers. 20 In contrast 
to the thorough account of discrimination against pregnant 
workers, the legislative history is devoid of any discussion of 
preferential treatment of pregnancy, beyond acknowledg-
ments of the existence of state statutes providing for such 
preferential treatment. See infra, at --. Opposition to 
the PDA came from those concerned with the cost of includ-
ing pregnancy in health and disability benefit plans and the 
application of the bill to abortion, 21 not from those who fa-
vored special accommodation of pregnancy. 
In support of their argument that the PDA prohibits em-
ployment practices that favor pregnant women, petitioners 
and several amici cite statements in the legislative history to 
the effect that the PDA does not require employers to extend 
any benefits to pregnant women that they do not already pro-
vide to other disabled employees. For example, the House 
Report explained that the proposed legislation "does not re-
quire employers to treat pregnant employees in any particu-
lar manner . . . . H. R. 6075 in no way requires the institu-
tion of any new programs where none currently exist." 22 We 
20 See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 8144 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (legisla-
tion "will end employment discrimination against pregnant workers"); 124 
Cong Rec. 21440 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Chisholm) (bill "affords some 41 
percent of this Nation's labor force some greater degree of protection and 
security without fear of reprisal due to to their decision to bear children"); 
id., at 21442 (remarks of Rep. Tsongas) (bill "would put an end to an unre-
alistic and unfair system that forces women to choose between family and 
career-clearly a function of sex bias in the law"); id., at 36818 (remarks of 
Sen. Javits) (the "bill represents only basic fairness for women employ-
ees"); id., at 38574 (remarks of Rep. Sarasin) (my subcommittee "learned 
of the many instances of discrimination against pregnant workers, as we 
learned of the hardships this discrimination brought to women and their 
families"). 
21 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-331, p. 9 (1977), Leg. Hist. 46 (discussing 
cost objections); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95- 1786, pp. 3-4 (1978), Leg. Hist. 
196-197 (application of the PDA to abortion). 
22 H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, p. at 4 (1978), Leg. Hist. 150. See also S. 
Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 4, Leg. Hist. 41; 123 Cong. Rec. 7540 (1977) 
85-494-0PINION 
16 CALIFORNIA FEDERAL S. & L. ASSN. v. GUERRA 
do not interpret these references to support petitioners' con-
struction of the statute. On the contrary, if Congress had 
intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it would have 
been the height of understatement to say only that the legis-
lation would not require such conduct. It is hardly conceiv-
able that Congress would have extensively discussed only its 
intent not to require preferential treatment if in fact it had 
intended to prohibit such treatment. 
We also find it significant that Congress was aware of state 
laws similar to California's but apparently did not consider 
them inconsistent with the PDA. In the debates and reports 
on the bill, Congress repeatedly acknowledged the existence 
of state antidiscrimination laws that prohibit sex discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy. 23 Two of the States men-
tioned then required employers to provide reasonable leave 
to pregnant workers. 24 After citing these state laws, Con-
(remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 10582 (remarks of Rep. Hawkins); id., at 
29387 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 29664 (remarks of Sen. Brooke). 
"'See, e. g., id., at 29387 (remarks of Sen. Javits), Leg. Hist. 67 ("sev-
eral state legislatures ... have chosen to address the problem by mandat-
ing certain types of benefits for pregnant employees"). See also S. Rep. 
No. 95-331, supra, at 3, Leg. Hist. 40; H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, supra, at 
10-11, Leg. Hist. 156-157; 123 Cong. Rec. 29648 (1977) (list of States that 
require coverage for pregnancy and pregnancy-related disabilities); id., at 
29662 (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
24 See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-126(g) (1977), now codified at § 46a-
60(a)(7) (1985); Mont. Rev. Codes § 41-2602 (Smith Supp. 1977), now codi-
fied at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-310 and 49-2-311 (1986). The Connecti-
cut statute provided, in relevant part: 
"It shall be an unfair employment practice 
"(g) For an employer ... (ii) to refuse to grant to [a pregnant] employee a 
reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from such preg-
nancy .... (iii) Upon signifying her intent to return, such employee shall 
be reinstated to her original job or to an equivalent position with equiva-
lent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other 
service credits unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's cir-
cumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do 
so." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-126(g) (1977). 
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gress failed to evince the requisite "clear and manifest pur-
pose" to supersede them. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development 
Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 206 (1983). To the contrary, both 
the House and Senate Reports suggest that these laws would 
continue to have effect under the PDA. 25 
Title VII, as amended by the PDA, and California's preg-
nancy disability leave statute share a common goal. The 
purpose of Title VII is "to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the 
past to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over 
other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 
424, 429-430 (1971). See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 
U. S. 69, 75, n. 7 (1984); Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co. , 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973). Rather than limiting exist-
ing Title VII principles and objectives, the PDA extends 
them to cover pregnancy. 26 As Senator Williams, a sponsor 
of the Act, stated: "The entire thrust ... behind this legisla-
tion is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully 
and equally in the workforce, without denying them the fun-
damental right to full participation in family life." 123 Gong. 
Rec. 29658 (1977). 
The Montana statute was virtually identical. Both have been recodified 
in current statutory compilations, but the leave and reinstatement require-
ments are unchanged. 
26 For example, the Senate Report states: "Since title VII does not pre-
empt State laws which would not require violating title VII . . . , these 
States would continue to be able to enforce their State laws if the bill were 
enacted." S. Rep. No. 95-331, supra, at 3, n. 1, Leg. Hist. 40. 
26 "Proponents of the bill repeatedly emphasized that the Supreme Court 
had erroneously interpreted congressional intent and that the amending 
legislation was necessary to reestablish the principles of Title VII law as 
they had been understood prior to the Gilbert decision." Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC , 462 U. S., at 679. 
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Section 12945(b)(2) also promotes equal employment 
opportunity. By requiring employers to reinstate women 
after a reasonable pregnancy disability leave, § 12945(b)(2) 
ensures that they will not lose their jobs on account of preg-
nancy disability. 27 California's approach is consistent with 
the dissenting opinion of JUSTICE BRENNAN in General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, which Congress adopted in enacting the 
PDA. Referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), a 
Title VI decision, JUSTICE BRENNAN stated: 
"[D]iscrimination is a social phenomenon encased in a so-
cial context and, therefore, unavoidably takes its mean-
ing from the desired end products of the relevant legisla-
tive enactment, end products that may demand due 
consideration of the uniqueness of the 'disadvantaged' in-
dividuals. A realistic understanding of conditions found 
in today's labor environment warrants taking pregnancy 
into account in fashioning disability policies." 429 
U. S., at 159 (footnote omitted). 
By "taking pregnancy into account," California's pregnancy 
disability leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have 
families without losing their jobs. 28 
Z7 As authoritatively construed by respondent Commission, the provision 
will "insure that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medi-
cal conditions have equal employment opportunities as persons not so af-
fected." Cal. Fair Employment and Housing Commission's Proposed 
Regulation § 7291.2(c) see App. JA49. 
28 We emphasize the limited nature of the benefits§ 12945(b)(2) provides. 
The California statute is not based on stereotypes or generalizations about 
the needs and abilities of pregnant workers. Such stereotypical assump-
tions would be inconsistent with equal employment opportunity for women; 
"if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender 
because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be 
innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate." Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 725 (1982). See also Los Angeles 
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart , 435 U. S. 702, 709 (1978); Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U. S. 542, 545 (1971) (MARSHALL, J., concur-
ring). However, § 12945(b)(2) does not reflect archaic or stereotypic 
notions about pregnancy. Disability due to pregnancy is not a stereotype 
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Thus petitioners' facial challenge to § 12945(b)(2) fails. 
The statute is not pre-empted by Title VII, as amended by 
the PDA, since the two statutory bases for pre-emption are 
lacking in this case. Section 12945(b)(2) does not require the 
doing of an act which is unlawful under Title VII , nor is it 
inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute. 29 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
and the California statute is narrowly drawn to cover only the period of 
actual physical disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions. 
29 Because we conclude that in enacting the PDA Congress did not intend 
to prohibit all favorable treatment of pregnancy, we need not address 
whether § 12945(b)(2) could be upheld as a legislative response to leave pol-
icies that have a disparate impact on pregnant workers. 
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